How Vietnam used soft power in 2012
Vietnam’s 2012 cultural diplomacy was a broad effort to present the country as open, dynamic and dependable while criticism intensified over arrests, censorship and restricted online speech. The campaign unfolded as Hanoi marked forty years of diplomatic relations with Australia, giving festivals, exchanges and public imagery a strategic setting.
Soft power, in the Joseph Nye sense, works through attraction rather than compulsion. Yet Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy was closely entangled with a coercive legal system, so the polished images of openness did not replace coercion; they competed with it for attention and credibility.
For Australian readers, especially Vietnamese communities in Melbourne and Sydney, this was not a distant exercise. It shaped what appeared at film festivals, how official stories reached local media, and how families and civic groups debated national prestige, community visibility and Australia’s own role.
Friendship diplomacy and state visibility
The diplomatic anniversary gave Hanoi a ready narrative: Vietnam had moved from isolation and conflict toward regional engagement and economic opportunity. Promotional material, official delegations and cultural programmes presented Australia as a longstanding partner rather than a distant Western government. Vietnam also promoted 2012 as a year focused on Australia, while Australian bodies organised events highlighting Vietnamese culture and bilateral ties.
The message travelled through familiar cultural assets—food, tourism, film, music, education and design. Embassies connected government agencies with universities, businesses and local councils, while public exhibitions and festivals placed Vietnamese imagery in prominent civic spaces. Such exchanges could build familiarity and trust, particularly among Australian officials, business leaders and cultural institutions.
The political value of this visibility lay in changing the subject. Instead of discussing imprisoned bloggers or blocked reporting, officials could emphasise investment, educational cooperation and a young population equipped for regional growth. The record does not prove that every event was designed as a propaganda counterweight, but the celebratory narrative performed that strategic role.
Soft power beside the coercive state
Vietnam’s legal pressure on critics continued throughout 2012. The sentencing of blogger Nguyễn Văn Huy to seven years that November, alongside prosecutions of other online commentators, made the contrast with festival hospitality impossible for informed observers to ignore. Article 258 and related state-security arguments allowed authorities to treat online criticism as a threat rather than ordinary political expression.
Cultural diplomacy did not remove these restrictions. It provided an alternative vocabulary for describing Vietnam: a nation of disciplined growth, respectful traditions and attractive consumer culture. This could reassure partners whose own public institutions questioned Vietnam’s media record, while making sustained criticism appear less reasonable by comparison.
The two tracks also served different audiences. Repression targeted domestic dissidents and critical journalists; cultural outreach aimed at foreign officials, students, festival audiences and diaspora communities. Calling the entire campaign “propaganda” would obscure the practical work done by films, exhibitions and institutional partnerships. It would also overlook how cultural producers and audiences sometimes reinterpreted official narratives for their own purposes.
Film, music and the travelling image
Vietnamese films offered a particularly effective form of soft power because they could appear independent of government statements while still benefiting from official promotion. Film weeks in Melbourne and Sydney, university events and subtitled screenings introduced audiences to Vietnamese landscapes, family structures, history and urban ambition. The works normalised a Vietnamese social world without requiring viewers to accept official descriptions of domestic politics.
Portable entertainment extended that cultural circuit into daily travel; a portable viewing guide illustrates how short screen sessions can become part of a commute. Film was not the only medium involved. Music performances, food demonstrations, fashion exhibitions and tourism promotions produced repeated sensory associations with Vietnam as energetic, colourful and culturally distinctive.
Translation and subtitles also revealed the limits of state control. Audiences could recognise the gap between a promoted image and the stories represented on screen. That tension sometimes strengthened interest rather than weakening it, although critics continued to face far greater risks than festival organisers or foreign programmers.
Why Australia mattered as an audience
Australian Vietnamese communities were concentrated in Melbourne’s Richmond, Footscray and Springvale suburbs and Sydney’s Cabramatta district. Their newspapers, radio programs, temples, restaurants and online networks gave the diplomatic campaign a local audience capable of evaluating both Hanoi’s messaging and Canberra’s response. Community divisions also mattered, as generational experiences of migration, war and state socialism produced sharply different views of national representation.
Australian public conversation often favours plain language and scepticism toward official spin. Expressions such as “fair go” and the “tall poppy” idea make official celebrations sound credible only when institutions and conduct support them. At community forums, media interviews and public meetings, Australians commonly pressed representatives directly about censorship, rights and whether cultural exchanges were genuinely reciprocal.
The cultural market reinforced that directness. Subtitled art-house films circulated through the Melbourne International Film Festival, Sydney Film Festival, independent cinemas, SBS and ABC, university societies, and streaming catalogues. Vietnamese-language programming reached specialist audiences, while public broadcasters and festivals introduced broader Australian viewers to unfamiliar stories. This mixed ecology was more useful to Hanoi than a single controlled channel because no gatekeeper had complete authority over interpretation.
Australian reception and durable effects
The campaign reached Australians through several overlapping pathways rather than through one national programme. The strength of each pathway depended on local intermediaries, institutional funding and the willingness of journalists and audiences to place official narratives under scrutiny.
Australian audiences encountered the cultural campaign through several channels:
- Vietnamese-language news outlets, radio programs and social feeds serving Richmond, Springvale and Cabramatta
- Independent cinemas, film societies and university festivals screening subtitled Vietnamese films
- Council-backed Lunar New Year events and community performances combining national symbolism with local sponsorship
- Tourism, education and business exchanges connecting Hanoi with Melbourne, Sydney and regional cities
Four broader mechanisms shaped the campaign’s likely influence:
- Positive state imagery entering partner institutions rather than appearing only in embassy publicity
- Trusted community figures and film programmers acting as intermediaries with Australian audiences
- Reciprocal events making the relationship visible to general publics, not only specialist networks
- Audience uptake measured through attendance, enrolment, media coverage and continued partnerships
These channels turned cultural diplomacy into a negotiated process. Hanoi supplied themes, access and institutional support, but Australian venues, community organisations and journalists determined which messages gained circulation. The resulting visibility could soften stereotypes, yet criticism of censorship also travelled alongside images of Vietnamese modernity.
Reading the 2012 campaign historically
The 2012 anniversary reveals the reach of Vietnamese soft power without proving that it succeeded. Festivals, films and exchanges strengthened Australia’s cultural familiarity with Vietnam and provided space for people-to-people contact. At the same time, arrests and restrictive media rules prevented the campaign from displacing the legal conflict that gave it strategic urgency.
Its effectiveness also varied by audience. Australian officials interested in trade and regional stability could treat the cultural programme as evidence of cooperation. Vietnamese diaspora communities might read it through questions of recognition, representation and government legitimacy. General audiences could encounter Vietnam through food, entertainment or travel imagery with little awareness of the political disputes surrounding the events.
The practical takeaway is to judge cultural diplomacy by who can speak, who can refuse, who receives resources and whether participation produces reciprocal exchange—not merely by the friendliness of its official images.